WHY WE NEED A COMPREHENSIVE RECORDING FRAUD REGISTRY by Johnson, Randall K
Mississippi College School of Law 
MC Law Digital Commons 
Journal Articles Faculty Publications 
9-9-2014 
WHY WE NEED A COMPREHENSIVE RECORDING FRAUD 
REGISTRY 
Randall K. Johnson 
Follow this and additional works at: https://dc.law.mc.edu/faculty-journals 





N.Y.U. Journal of Legislation and Public Policy 
Quorum 
RANDALL K. JOHNSON 
 
 
WHY WE NEED A COMPREHENSIVE 
RECORDING FRAUD REGISTRY 
 
 
September 9, 2014 
 
 
Abstract: This essay argues for a modest expansion of the 
Nationwide Mortgage Licensing System and Registry 
(NMLS) in order to detect and deter more recording fraud. 
It does so, initially, by explaining why this online registry 
limits mortgage fraud. The essay later describes how the 
NMLS could detect or deter other crimes, such as deed 
fraud and lien fraud. Lastly, it deals with concerns about a 
Comprehensive Recording Fraud Registry. 
 
 
Author: Randall K. Johnson is an Assistant Professor of 
Law at Mississippi College, School of Law in Jackson, MS. 
 
© 2014 N.Y.U. Journal of Legislation and Public Policy 
Published by the 2014–15 Editorial Board of the N.Y.U. Journal of Legislation and Public Policy. 
 






WHY WE NEED A COMPREHENSIVE 








onventional legal wisdom assumes that public records limit recording 
fraud.
1
 This assumption is accepted by the public and practitioners.
2
 
So, if the assumption is correct, why has recording fraud increased over 
time?
3
 The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) offers a partial explanation.
4
 In a 
new report, the DOJ explains why its public records cannot fully detect or deter 
recording fraud.
5
 These difficulties arise from at least three agency-specific is-
sues.
6
 The DOJ’s issues include the “underreporting and misclassification of 
mortgage fraud cases[, the failure] . . . to include the mortgage fraud code [when 
 
* Assistant Professor of Law, Mississippi College, School of Law, Jackson, MS 39201. J.D., 
University of Chicago Law School; M.U.P., New York University; M.Sc., London School of Eco-
nomics; B.A., University of Michigan. Special thanks to Dean Wendy B. Scott, Professor Jim Ros-
enblatt, and the Mississippi College, School of Law’s Publications Grant Program. 
1 See Audrey G. McFarlane, The Properties of Instability: Markets, Predation, Racialized 
Geography, and Property Law, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 855, 882 (2011) (“It is generally assumed that 
the problems presented by our woefully old-fashioned land records system have been smoothed 
out…, but that is not quite the case.”).  
2 See Chad J. Pomeroy, Ending Surprise Liens On Real Property, 11 NEV. L.J. 139, 141 
(2010) (“Most people, and most attorneys, believe that bona fide purchasers of real property are 
protected against unknown third parties later claiming superior title or rights.”). 
3See Lisa Parker, Loophole Helps Criminals File Fraudulent Deeds, NBCCHICAGO.COM 
(Nov. 20, 2013), http://www.nbcchicago.com/news/local/Loophole-Helps-Criminals-File-
Fraudulent-Deeds-232444821.html (“The FBI calls [recording fraud]… the fasest [sic] growing 
white collar crime in the country.”). 
4 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., AUDIT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF 
JUSTICE’S EFFORTS TO ADDRESS MORTGAGE FRAUD (March 2014).   
5 Id. at i. 
6 See id. 
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this type of recording fraud is] . . . not the leading charge in a case . . . [and the 
use of an unreliable method of obtaining statistics].”
7
 
To address these issues, the DOJ has undertaken a series of reforms.
8
 For 
example, the DOJ disclosed its past record-keeping issues.
9
 It also adopted a bet-
ter approach to obtaining and verifying statistics.
10
 Lastly, the DOJ called for 
more informed federal prosecutorial decisions.
11
 
Unfortunately, the DOJ’s reforms will only partially limit recording 
fraud.
12
 These reforms will not be effective in many cases unless recording fraud 
implicates federal subject-matter jurisdiction.
13
 Thus, other approaches are need-
ed to detect and deter state crimes.
14
 
One approach, which the DOJ has used successfully in other contexts,
15
 
is to access the public records of local government agencies.
16
 Local public rec-
 
7 Id. at i–ii. 
8 See id. at 29–30.   
9 Id. at 29.   
10 Id. at 30.   
11 Id.   
12 Cf. McFarlane, supra note 1, at 882 (“A number of recent news stories have shown that 
some property owners have been subject to a [type of recording fraud] sometimes referred to as 
‘deed theft’ [or, alternately, as ‘deed fraud’] whereby [these property owners] either are tricked into 
signing a document transferring their [unmortgaged] property or a deed to their property has been 
forged and used to fraudulently transfer ownership.”).  
13 The DOJ’s reforms primarily focus on mortgage fraud and related crimes. The focus on 
these federal crimes fails to address some of the fastest growing types of recording fraud, which 
often fail to implicate federal subject-matter jurisdiction. Deed fraud is one example of recording 
fraud that may not implicate such jurisdiction, at least in those situations where the victim’s proper-
ty is not encumbered by a mortgage. Another example is lien fraud in cases where “the person fil-
ing the document knows the filing is false, [but nonetheless records a state-level lien].” Sara A. 
Wiswall, Remedies for Removing Unlawful Liens or Encumbrances: A Response to “Paper Terror-
ism,” 30 MCGEORGE L. REV. 546, 551 (1999).  
14 Alternately, where subject-matter jurisdiction is implicated, the accused could face a host 
of federal charges. These charges may include: 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1994) (“Conspiracy to Defraud”), 
18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2006) (“False Statements”), 18 U.S.C. § 1005 (2002) (“False Entries”), 18 
U.S.C. § 1014 (2011) (“False Statements on a Loan or Credit Application”), 18 U.S.C. § 1341 
(2008) (“Mail Fraud”), 18 U.S.C. § 1342 (1994) (“Fictitious Name or Address”), 18 U.S.C. § 1343 
(2014) (“Wire Fraud”), 18 U.S.C. § 1344 (1989) (“Bank Fraud”), 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (2012) (“Laun-
dering of Monetary Instruments”) and 18 U.S.C. § 1957 (2012) (“Engaging in Monetary Transac-
tions in Property Derived from Specified Unlawful Activity”). Cf. FED. FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
EXAMINATION COUNCIL, THE DETECTION AND DETERRENCE OF MORTGAGE FRAUD AGAINST 
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS: A WHITE PAPER app. c (2009) (Criminal Statutes). 
15A good example of the DOJ’s past success is 28 C.F.R. § 23, which “governs interjurisdic-
tional and multijurisdictional criminal intelligence systems that are operated by or on behalf of state 
and local law enforcement agencies and that are funded with certain federal funds.” Frequently 
Asked Questions, Criminal Intelligence Systems, Operating Policies (28 CFR Part 23), INSTITUTE 
FOR INTERGOVERNMENTAL RESEARCH, http://www.iir.com/28CFR_Program/28CFR_FAQ (last vis-
ited Aug. 25, 2014). 
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ords already limit some recording fraud under the auspices of the Nationwide 
Mortgage Licensing System and Registry (NMLS).
17
 The NMLS is an online 
registry which has information about mortgage fraud in all fifty states.
18
 
The NMLS demonstrates that government agencies with better access to 
information are, on average, more effective in detecting and deterring crimes.
19
 
For example, DOJ officials have started to use this online registry
20
 along with 
other third-party data
21
 to make more informed prosecutorial decisions.
22
 By do-




16 Richard G. Flood et al., Intergovernmental Cooperation, Illinois Institute for Continuing 
Legal Education 8.2 (2012) (“[This approach, which is often referred to as intergovernmental coop-
eration,]… contemplates that local governments… [will] contract and associate among themselves, 
as well as with [their parent state], other states, and the federal government [, in order to achieve 
their shared policy goals].”). 
17 Bryce Gray, VI. The Secure and Fair Enforcement for Mortgage Licensing Act of 2008, 31 
REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 51, 53 (2011). (“[The Secure and Fair Enforcement for Mortgage Licensing Act 
of 2008, which authorized the creation of the NMLS,] explicitly declares that [its] purpose . . . is to ‘in-
crease uniformity, reduce regulatory burdens, enhance consumer protection, and reduce fraud.’”). 
18 2013 STATE REGULATORY REGISTRY LLC ANN. REP. 8, 
http://www.csbs.org/srr/Documents/SRR%20AR%202013%20Final%20%28Web%29%20%282%
29.pdf  (last visited Aug. 25, 2014) (“In 2013, all states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico and 
the U.S. Virgin Islands participated in NMLS. . . . This full representation of the… mortgage indus-
try in a single system makes it possible for [federal and] state regulators and [the banking] industry 
to have the information needed to identify [not only] business and licensing activities and trends” 
but also mortgage fraud). 
19 Cf., e.g., Randall K. Johnson, Why Police Learn from Third-Party Data, 3 WAKE FOREST 
L. REV. ONLINE 1, 4 (2013); Randall K. Johnson, Do Police Learn from Lawsuit Data?, 40 
RUTGERS L. REC. 30, 37–38 (2012–2013). 
20 NMLS Resource Center, State Model Language for Implementation of Public Law 110-289, 
Title V – S.A.F.E. Mortgage Licensing Act 5 (2014), http://mortgage.nationwidelicensingsystem.org/ 
SAFE/NMLS%20Document%20Library/MSL-Final.pdf (last visited Aug. 30, 2014) (“in order to re-
duce the points of contact which the Federal Bureau of Investigation may have to maintain . . . the 
Commissioner may use the Nationwide Mortgage Licensing System and Registry as a channeling 
agent for requesting information from and distributing information to the Department of Justice.”). 
21 Cf. Elizabeth Griffith, Translating Research to Practice and Building Capacity to Use 
Data, Research, Planning and Problem-Solving, TRANSLATIONAL CRIMINOLOGY, Spring 2014, at 9 
(“The Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA), the U.S. Department of Justice’s policy- and grant-
making agency, has in recent years prioritized the use of data… to target and manage its re-
sources… and build [on the DOJ’s] criminal justice professional capacity.”). 
22 See, e.g., ROBERT V. WOLF, CENTER FOR COURT INNOVATION, A FULL RESPONSE TO AN 
EMPTY HOUSE: PUBLIC SAFETY STRATEGIES FOR ADDRESSING MORTGAGE FRAUD AND THE 
FORECLOSURE CRISIS 2 (2010) (report supported by BJA under federal grant). 
23 Nicole Forbes Stowell, Katherine Barker-Cagwin, and James Fellows, Mortgage Fraud: 
Current Trends and Issues, 37 REAL ESTATE ISSUES 42 (2012) (“According to the Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS), the number of mortgage and real estate fraud convictions increased by almost 40 
percent from 2009 to 2011); accord IRS, Statistical Data – Mortgage and Real Estate Fraud (Sept. 
1, 2014), http://www.irs.gov/uac/Mortgage-and-Real-Estate-Fraud (“Special agents with IRS Crim-
inal Investigation are uniquely equipped to investigate these types of mortgage and illegal real es-
tate crimes because they are skilled financial investigators whose mission is to ‘follow the money’  
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This improvement, however, raises an important question: can the 
NMLS help to detect and deter even more recording fraud?
24
 The question is im-
portant because it acknowledges the benefits of the NMLS, while underscoring 
the need for more state-level regulation. This essay, therefore, answers the ques-
tion as it pertains to deed fraud and lien fraud.
25
 Part I provides background in-
formation about the NMLS. Part II calls for a modest expansion of the NMLS, so 
as to include local public records about deed fraud and lien fraud. Part III is the 
conclusion. 
PART I. BACKGROUND 
The NMLS was created by the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 
2008.
26
 Title V of the Act, entitled the Secure and Fair Enforcement of Mortgage 
Licensing Act,
27
 charges the NMLS with “the establishment of a national federal 
database that would register all mortgage [loan] originators. . . [and] the creation 
of a mandatory state licensing regime.”
28
 As a result, the NMLS detects and de-
ters one type of recording fraud (i.e. mortgage fraud).
29
 
Specifically, the NMLS limits mortgage fraud by making it possible for 
regulators to access information necessary for identifying illegal activity.
30
 There 
are three reasons why. First, this online registry “improve[s] transparency and 
[the quality of] information available concerning state-licensed and registered 
 
. . . . Once they have obtained the evidence, IRS agents forward their investigation to the Depart-
ment of Justice for criminal prosecution.”). 
24 This question has not been asked or answered because state-level types of recording fraud 
were not a traditional focus of scholarly attention. Examples of these state-level types of recording 
fraud include deed fraud and lien fraud. 
25 Deed fraud and lien fraud are the focus of analysis for three reasons. First, these crimes 
have been under-theorized by scholars. Next, these crimes have become more popular over time. 
Lastly, local governments collect information about these crimes. See, e.g., infra Table 1. Fraudu-
lent Document Notices in Cook County, Illinois (2009 to 2013).    
26 STATE REGULATORY REGISTRY, supra note 18, at 20. (“On July 30, 2008, President 
George W. Bush signed into law The Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008. Title V of this 
Act, entitled The Secure and Fair Enforcement for Mortgage Licensing Act of 2008, or the SAFE 
Act, contained provisions to enhance consumer protection and reduce mortgage fraud.”). 
27 12 U.S.C. §§ 5101–5116 (2008). 
28 Kale Gans, Note, Anatomy of a Mortgage Meltdown: The Story of the Subprime Crisis, 
The Role of Fraud, and the Efficacy of the Idaho SAFE Act, 48 IDAHO L. REV. 123, 153–54 (2011). 
29 STATE REGULATORY REGISTRY, supra note 18, at 20(“The SAFE Act contained specific mandates 
for NMLS. . . .They include: Establishing protocols for the issuance of NMLS Unique Identifiers. 
Receiving and processing of fingerprints for federal criminal history background checks for all 
MLOs. Developing and administering a qualified written test. Reviewing and approving pre-
licensure and continuing education courses. Providing public access to licensing information on all 
residential mortgage licensed loan originators. Developing and implementing the NMLS Mortgage 
Call Report. Making publicly adjudicated disciplinary and enforcement actions available to the 
public. . . . [and facilitating] the collection and disbursement of consumer complaints.”).   
30 See STATE REGULATORY REGISTRY, supra note 18, at 8. 
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companies and professionals.”
31
 Second, the NMLS “facilitate[s] the sharing of 
regulatory enforcement information among [federal and] state regulators.”
32
 Fi-
nally, this online registry provides “easily accessible information” about the dis-
tribution, frequency and amount of mortgage fraud.
33
  
The NMLS, in other words, lowers the cost of regulation.
34
 It does so by 
providing more complete information about mortgage fraud
35
 and also identifies 
the underlying causes of these crimes.
36
 Lastly, the online registry helps to ad-
dress a range of information failures.
37
    
Within this context, it is clear why the NMLS helps to limit mortgage 
fraud.
38
 First, this online registry “demonstrates . . . the institutional advantages 
that states have over the federal government.”
39
 The NMLS also helps to detect 
and deter more crimes “by doing what is possible given the competing interests 
of the relevant parties and the structural constraints of horizontal federalism and 
 
31 NMLS, REQUEST FOR PUBLIC COMMENTS: REPORTING OF STATE REGULATORY ACTIONS 1 
(2011), http://mortgage.nationwidelicensingsystem.org/news/ProposalsForComment/2011-3-Comments-
for-Reg-Actions.pdf (last visited Sept. 1, 2014). 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 Cf. Kristin Madison, Health Regulators as Data Stewards, 92 N.C. L. REV. 1605, 1607–
08 (2014) (“The federal government is more than just a big data repository, however, it has become 
a data steward. The term ‘data stewardship’ can have many meanings, and it is sometimes associat-
ed with the responsibility for protecting the integrity and confidentiality of data. . . . One of the 
meanings of ‘steward’ is ‘one who actively directs affairs’ . . . . In recent years . . . the federal gov-
ernment has taken on an increasingly important role in managing the flow of health-related data. By 
doing so, it has affected health care decision making and accelerated . . . reform.”). 
35 See, e.g., NMLS, NMLS Mortgage Industry Report, 2014 Q1 Update 7–8 (June 11, 2014), 
http://mortgage.nationwidelicensingsystem.org/about/Reports/2014Q1-Mortgage-Report.pdf (Last 
accessed on August 25, 2014). 
36 STATE REGULATORY REGISTRY, supra note 18 at 4. (This information has been gained in 
several ways, such as when the NMLS created a “nationwide pilot program [to test a] risk profiling 
tool [that used] Mortgage Call Report data to evaluate mortgage companies” and compare them to 
entities within their peer groups and “identify potential risky behavior.”). 
37 Id. at 20. (The NMLS overcomes informational asymmetries, for example, by making 
“publicly adjudicated disciplinary and enforcement actions available to the public. . . . As of year-
end 2013, 40 state agencies had posted 3,100 public regulatory actions and federally-registered 
MLOs had reported 529 actions.”)  
38 Cf. Lloyd T. Wilson, Jr., All Things Considered: The Contribution of the National Mort-
gage Licensing  System to the Battle Against Predatory Lending, 24 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 415, 430–
31 (2007) (“State regulators are expected to benefit from the database as it will enhance their ability 
to ‘share information with other states’ . . . . Consumers are expected to benefit as the database will 
be a central information source that will provide consumers with a way to ‘check on the license sta-
tus of the mortgage broker or lender they wish to do business with, as well as a way to determine 
whether a state has taken enforcement action against that company or individual.’ . . .  Mortgage 
lending or brokering companies could similarly benefit from the database by using it as part of their 
. . . pre-employment screening.”). 
39 Id. at 473.  
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vertical federalism.”
40
 Finally, this online registry makes “a positive contribution 




PART II. DISCUSSION 
This essay calls for a modest expansion of the NMLS to include local 
public records about deed fraud and lien fraud.
42
 The expansion should be em-
braced, especially by the DOJ, for three basic reasons. First, this expansion may 
be achieved at little-to-no cost.
43
 It also could detect and deter more recording 
fraud.
44
 Lastly, the expansion would help prevent future litigation.
45
  
A more comprehensive Recording Fraud Registry also could provide 
useful information about the distribution, frequency and amount of recording 
fraud.
46
 This expanded registry may do so by collecting and analyzing local pub-
lic records such as Fraudulent Document Notices.
47
 These data then could be 
 
40 Id. at 474. 
41 Id. 
42 See infra Table 1. (Table 1 provides information about, and some analysis of, recording 
fraud in Cook County, Illinois. Similar data and analysis also would be available, only on a nation-
wide basis, through a Comprehensive Recording Fraud Registry.) 
43 STATE REGULATORY REGISTRY, supra note 18, at 25. (“To fund NMLS operations, func-
tionality and enhancements, as well as to achieve the objectives of the SAFE Act, NMLS charges 
various fees for services provided. . . . Other NMLS services, such as . . . NMLS Consumer Access 
are provided at no charge to the user.”). 
44 Cf. NMLS Resource Center, States Expand Use of NMLS to New Industries, 
http://mortgage.nationwidelicensingsystem.org/news/Pages/ExpandedUse.aspx. (last visited Aug. 
26, 2014) (this improved ability to detect, and deter, crime would not be without precedent: as the 
NMLS already helps to limit a variety of state-level crimes).    
45 See, e.g., Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Office of Public Affairs, Nebraska “Sovereign 
Citizen” Convicted of Filing False Liens against Federal Officials and Federal Tax Crimes (Aug.4, 
2014), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2014/August/14-tax-818.html (“A federal jury in Omaha, Ne-
braska, found Donna Marie Kozak guilty . . . of conspiracy to file and filing false liens against two 
U.S. District Court Judges, the U.S. Attorney for the District of Nebraska, two Assistant U.S. At-
torneys and an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) special agent.”).Cf. David J. Cook, Addressing the 
Problem of Bogus Liens, 36 L.A. LAWYER MAGAZINE, DEC. 2012, at 12, 12 (“Litigants can be angry 
and irrational. . . . These individuals may file or record fraudulent liens to retaliate [against a prop-
erty owner] . . . . Although these liens may be clearly illegitimate, their expungement requires a 
court order, costing victims significant time and effort.”).  
46 See infra Table 1. 
47 Letter from the Cook County Recorder of Deeds (CCRD) to author 1–2 (Apr. 10, 2014) 
(on file with author) (“[In Cook County, Illinois, the] . . . indexing of any document under the doc-
type/index Fraudulent Document Notice is directly related to the customer submitting for recording 
a document actually titled “Fraudulent Document Notice” (or minor variation thereof). The index 
was created for customer convenience [by the Cook County Recorder of Deeds] . . . . The customer 
defined what was fraudulent within their Notice document, and recorded said Notice with CCRD 
historical public records library for customer’s own private purposes. . . . The CCRD library does 
not perform classifications. The CCRD simply indexes documents based on the specific document 
title appearing on the document exactly as prepared by the customer. If a document title is unclear, 
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made available through NMLS Consumer Access, which is a “fully searchable 
website that allows the public to view information [about NMLS registrants].”
48
     
It also must be recognized that some elected officials may oppose the 
recommendation, especially on due process grounds.
49
 This opposition could be 
overcome in many ways. First, the NMLS could assure that, before any infor-
mation is incorporated into NMLS Consumer Access, the accused has the oppor-
tunity to challenge any unfounded claims.
50
 It also may guarantee that any data 
that has been expressly “protected by state law before submission . . . [remains] 
protected in the same way” after submission.
51
 Finally, the NMLS could provide 
an opportunity for the accused party to submit exculpatory information.
52
 
If this recommendation is accepted, then the NMLS will need an imple-
mentation plan. This plan may take several forms. For example, the NMLS could 
pursue a grant from the DOJ’s Office of Justice programs.
53
 It also may seek fed-
eral legislative action to codify this recommendation. Lastly, the NMLS could 




the document may be indexed under Miscellaneous as a courtesy. Document numbers concerning 
any previously recorded document(s) (“underlying documents”) must be included by the customer 
within said Notice, in order for the CCRD to provide a software link between the Notice and the 
customer’s referenced documents.”). See infra Table 1 (Those data that are found  in Table 1, 
which provide information and analysis of recording fraud in Cook County, Illinois over time, thus 
only represent those Fraudulent Document Notices with a Property Identification Number (PIN). 
Fraudulent Document Notices with a missing PIN, or that duplicate an earlier entry in the Recorder 
of Deeds’ database, are omitted from this analysis. There were three omissions in 2010, four omis-
sions in 2011, five omissions in 2012 and 21 omissions in 2013.). 
48 See NMLS, Information About NMLS Consumer Access (July 7, 2014), 
http://mortgage.nationwidelicensingsystem.org/licensees/resources/LicenseeResources/Information
%20about%20NMLS%20Consumer%20Access.pdf (last visited Aug. 7, 2014) (this approach 
would also provide victims of recording fraud with an administrative remedy against individuals or 
companies, which wrongfully cloud their titles.). 
49 See Christopher Walljasper, If you think you own your own home, You’d better check the Deed 
on file with the County, MEDILL REPORTS CHICAGO (Dec. 4, 2013),  http://news.medill.northwestern.edu/ 
chicago/news.aspx?id=226205 (“Jeanne Ives, [an Illinois] Republican who represents the southwest 
suburbs, said that while she understands the dangers of [recording] fraud, [the Cook County Record-
er’s 2013 reforms] were too heavy handed. . . . Jack Franks, a Democrat who represents a northwest 
suburban district, agrees. . . .‘I don’t think there is empirical evidence that enhanced penalties will re-
duce these crimes.’”). 
50 Cf. Wilson, supra note 38, at 461. 
51 Id. at 460. 
52 Cf. id. at 462. 
53 DOJ, Business and Grants, http://www.justice.gov/business/ (last visited Aug. 26, 2014) 
(“Office of Justice Programs offers federal financial assistance to scholars, practitioners, experts 
and state and local governments and agencies.”).   
54 Cf. STATE REGULATORY REGISTRY, supra note 18, at 20 (For example, an NMLS working 
group “developed a user agreement with [the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB)] to 
allow a pilot group of states access to CFPB’s Government Portal, which is a gateway to the 
CFPB’s consumer complaint data base. Eleven state agencies participated in this pilot, which al-
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CONCLUSION 
This essay argues for a modest expansion of the NMLS, in order to de-
tect and deter more recording fraud. It does so, initially, by explaining why this 
online registry limits mortgage fraud. The essay later describes how the NMLS 
could detect or deter other crimes, such as deed fraud and lien fraud. Lastly, it 
deals with concerns about a Comprehensive Recording Fraud Registry. 
  
 
lowed authorized users to search, filter and extract CFPB consumer complaint information related 
to the state agency’s jurisdiction.”).  
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Table 1. Fraudulent Document Notices in Cook County, Illinois (2009 to 2013) 
 
55 Office of the Cook County Clerk, Tax Code Rate Summary 1–158 (July 6, 2012). 
56 Office of the Cook County Recorder, Fraudulent Document Notices: 2009 to 2013, 
http://12.218.239.81/i2/default.aspx# (2014) (displaying an interface that permits the entry of infor-
mation, which identifies fraudulent document notices over time, by entering: From: 01/01/20xx, To: 
12/31/20xx, Document Type: Fraudulent Doc Notice, and Search); Office of the Cook County Asses-
sor, Property Characteristics, 2014 Tax Year Property Information, www.cookcountyassessor.com/ 
Captcha/VerificationPage.aspx?Pin=16133040220000 (2014) (displaying an interface that permits the 






TOWNSHIPS55 200956 201057 201158 201259 201360 TOTALS61 
BARRINGTON 
(100, 101) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
BERWYN 
(110) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
BLOOM 
(120, 121, 122) 
0 2 0 1 1 4 
BREMEN 
(130, 131) 
0 1 0 0 0 1 
CALUMET 
(140) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
CICERO 
(150) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
ELK GROVE 
(160, 161, 164) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
EVANSTON 
(170) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
HANOVER 
(180, 181) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
LEMONT 
(190) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
LEYDEN 
(200, 201, 202, 204) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
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LYONS 
(210, 211, 212, 214) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
MAINE 
(220, 221, 222) 
0 1 0 0 0 1 
NEW TRIER 
(230, 234) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
NILES 
(240, 244) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
NORTHFIELD 
(250, 251, 252) 
1 0 0 0 0 1 
NORWOOD PARK 
(260) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
OAK PARK 
(270) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
ORLAND 
(280) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
PALATINE 
(290, 291) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
PALOS 
(300) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
PROVISO 
(310, 311, 314) 
0 0 1 1 0 2 
RICH 
(320, 321, 324) 
0 0 0 1 1 2 
RIVER FOREST 
(330) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
RIVERSIDE 
(340) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
SCHAUMBURG 
(350) 
0 0 0 1 0 1 
STICKNEY 
(360, 361) 
0 0 1 0 0 1 
THORNTON 
(370, 371, 372) 
0 1 3 2 2 8 
WHEELING 
(380, 381, 382) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
WORTH 
(390, 391) 
1 0 0 0 0 1 
HYDE PARK 
(700) 
2 4 2 1 4 13 
JEFFERSON 
(710, 711) 
0 0 0 5 1 6 
LAKE 
(720, 721) 
0 6 2 3 3 14 
N.Y.U. JOURNAL OF LEGISLATION & PUBLIC POLICY QUORUM JOHNSON 





0 0 1 0 1 2 
NORTH CHICAGO 
(740) 
0 1 0 0 0 1 
ROGERS PARK 
(750) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
SOUTH CHICAGO 
(760, 765) 





0 1 0 1 2 4 
COOK COUNTY 
TOTALS 
4 17 10 16 15 62 
